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The Relationship Between International Law and
Municipal Law in Light of the
Constitution of the Republic of Namibia
DJ. Devine *
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 12, 1884, the German Empire proclaimed a protectorate
over the area of South West Africa present day Namibia.' This protec-
torate did not include the port and enclave of Walvis Bay2 or the so-
called twelve Penguin Islands off the coast of South West Africa.' The
German protectorate continued until the First World War when South
West Africa was invaded and occupied by South African forces in
1915. +
In 1920, after the conclusion of the war, The League of Nations
granted to South Africa a Mandate to administer the territory.5 When
the League of Nations was disbanded after the Second World War,6 the
newly created United Nations endeavored to get South Africa to convert
South West Africa into a U.N. trust territory so that the U.N. could
Professor of Law, Director, Institute of Marine Law, University of Cape Town.
75 BRnT. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 528, 528-38 (1891); ALBERTUS J. HOFFMANN, DIE RE-
GIME VAN ELANDE IN DIE INTERNASIONALE REG MET SPESIALE VERWYSING NA DIE SUID-
AFR.AANSE EIIANDE AAN DIE KUS VAN SUIDWES-AFRIKA/NAMIBIE 124 (1987).
2 See John Dugard, Public International Law, 1977 ANN. SuRv. S. AFR. L. 49, 54 (1977).
' The Penguin Islands were recognized as part of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope in
1886 by the Protocol of Berlin concluded between the United Kingdom and the German Empire.
A regime of joint control was instituted between Namibia and South Africa over Walvis Bay and
the Penguin Islands in November, 1992. The regime was governed by the Joint Administrative
Authority for Walvis Bay Act 93 of 1993. South Africa did not renounce it's claim to sover-
eignty over the areas in question. On the 16th of August, 1993, a resolution was adopted at the
South African multi-party negotiations accepting the incorporation of the areas into Namibia and
requesting the government to report back within a month on progress on incorporation. Walvis
Bay "To Go To Namibia", CAPE TIMES, Aug. 17, 1993, at 1. The eventual incorporation of
Walvis Bay into Namibia on March 1, 1994 was governed by the Transfer of Walvis Bay to
Namibia Act 203 of 1993.
' A South African Military Governor was appointed by Proclamation dated July 11, 1915,
made by the South African Minister of Defence. See THE SOUTH WEST AFRICAINAMIBIA DIS-
PuTE 27 (John Dugard ed., 1973).
5 MiCHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 249 (4th ed.
1982); THE SOUTH WEST AFRICAINAMIBIA DISPUTE, supra note 4, at 69.
6 AKEHURST, supra note 5, at 249; THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA DISPUTE, supra note
4, at 96.
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supervise its administration Upon South Africa's refusal, its relation-
ship with the U.N. became marked by friction. The U.N. alleged that
South Africa was not observing its Mandate of administration,' and,
after a series of appearances before the International Court of Justice, 9
the U.N. General Assembly purported, in 1966, to revoke the Mandate
and claimed the right to administer the territory itself.'" A United Na-
tions Council for Namibia was created to administer the territory." The
Security Council of the United Nations confirmed the revocation of the
Mandate in 1970,2 as did the International Court of Justice in an Ad-
visory Opinion in 1971.'
In the years which followed, both South Africa and the U.N. had to
seek new avenues for resolving the dispute.'4 At first, South Africa
tried to forge its own internal scheme for achieving the independence of
Namibia, but this did not meet with international approval. 5 Eventual-
ly, through the good offices and diplomacy of five Western nations,
6
South Africa accepted a settlement plan to ensure Namibian indepen-
dence.'7 The plan was embodied in the famous Security Council Reso-
lution 453 of 1978.8 Resolution 435 was not, however, to be imple-
mented for more than a decade principally due to South Africa's de-
mand that Cuban troops be withdrawn from neighboring Angola to
' AKEHURST, supra note 5, at 249; THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMBIA DISPUTE, supra note
4, at 111.
8 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 676 (4th ed. 1990); THE
SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA DISPUTE, supra note 4, at 211.
9 International Status of South West Africa, 1950 I.CJ. Pleadings 127 (July 11, 1950); 1955
I.CJ. 67; 1956 I.C.J. 23; South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa, Liberia v. South Africa),
1962 I.CJ. 319; South West Africa cases (Liber. & Eth. v. S. Aft.), 1966 I.CJ. 4 (second
phase).
'o G.A. Res. 2145, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
" General Assembly Resolution 2248 (XXII). In 1973 the General Assembly voted to rec-
ognize the South West Africa Peoples' Organization (SWAPO) as the "authentic representative of
the Namibian People." G.A. Res. 3111, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30 at 93, U.N. Doc.
A19030 (1973).
2 Resolution 276 (1970).
'3 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1970 I.CJ. 359
(Aug. 5).
'" For a concise description of the post-1971 events leading to Namibian independence in
1990, see Marinus; Weichers, Namibia: The 1982 Constitutional Principles and Their Legal Sig-
nificance, 15 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 1-2 (1989-90).
15 Id.
6 Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. See id. at 2.
17 Id.
" U.N. SCOR, 34th Sess., 2087-2088th mtgs. at 12, U.N. Doc. S/INF134.
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ensure free and fair elections in Namibia under U.N. supervision. 9
During the 1980's, political and diplomatic negotiations contin-
ued." One of the main achievements of that decade was the 1982 Con-
stitutional Principles.2' These principles were agreed to by the interested
parties as those upon which a future Constitution for Namibia should be
based.' Elections under U.N. supervision were held in 1989, and a
Constituent Assembly convened on November 21, of that year for pur-
poses of adopting a Constitution.' A Constitution which accorded with
the 1982 Constitutional Principles was, in fact, adopted, and Namibia
became independent under that Constitution on March 21, 1990.24
The Constitution of Namibia contains provisions on what the law is
in the new state of Namibia. In particular, articles 140(1) and 66(1) of
this Constitution contain the relevant provisions. Article 140, entitled
"The Law in Force at the Date of Independence" provides:
Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, all laws which were in
force immediately before the date of Independence shall remain in
force until repealed or amended by Act of Parliament or until they are
declared unconstitutional by a competent Court."
The laws in force immediately before independence would include South
African legislation applicable in Namibia, and the common and custom-
ary law then applicable.' More specifically, on the question of com-
mon and customary law, article 66, entitled with "Customary and Com-
mon Law" provides:
Both the customary law and the common law of Namibia in force on
the date of Independence shall remain valid to the extent to which
such customary or common law does not conflict with this Constitution
or any other statutory law2
W' weichers, supra note 14, at 2.
2 Id.
21 id.
n Id.
2 Id.
24 Id. at 1.
5 NAMIB. CONsT. ch. 20, art. 140(1).
' The common law in force in Namibia at the date of independence was the Roman-Dutch
common law - which also applies in South Africa. Roman-Dutch common law was introduced
as the basic law of the former South West Africa after the First World War when South Africa
received a mandate from the League of Nations: Administration of Justice Proclamation (No. 21)
of 1919. See ROBERT W. LEE, AN INTRODUCION TO ROMAN-DurCH LAW 13 (5th ed. 1953).
Indigenous African customary law was also part of the law and continues to be so in terms of
article 66(1).
" NAAIB. CONST. ch. 7, art. 66(1). Article 44 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he legis-
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In addition, judicial supremacy is entrenched. The constitutionality
of any statutory law can be tested by either the Supreme Court or the
High Court.28 Also, both courts retain all powers of interpretation and
application of other laws which the former High Court of South West
Africa possessed.29
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE FORMER SOUTH WEST AFRICA
The extent to which international law was a part of the law of
Namibia at the date of independence, March 21, 1990, is governed by
the common law. In describing this situation, reference will be made to
court decisions which, as a matter of stare decisis, would have been
binding law in the former South West Africa, up to the date of indepen-
dence. International treaty law, in order to be part of South West Afri-
can law, would have to have been translated into law by legislation."
International customary law also formed part of the law of South West
lative power of Namibia shall be vested in the National Assembly with the power to pass laws
with the assent of the President as provided in this Constitution subject, where applicable, to the
powers and functions of the National Council as set out in this Constitution." Id. ch. 7, art. 44.
Article 79(2) provides, in pertinent part, that "[tihe Supreme Court shall ...hear and adjudicate
upon appeals .. . including appeals which involve the interpretation, implementation and uphold-
ing of this Constitution ...." Id. ch. 9, art. 79(2). Article 80(2) provides, in pertinent part, that
"[t]he High Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate upon all civil disputes
and criminal prosecutions, including cases which involve the interpretation, implementation and
upholding of this Constitution. ... Id. ch. 9, art. 80(2).
When the provisions of article 66(1) are considered with the above quoted provisions of
articles 44, 79(2), and 80(2) of the Constitution, a clear hierarchy of law emerges in Namibia.
The Roman-Duteh law and indigenous African customary law are the basic law of the land; but,
in case of conflict between them and statutory law, or the Constitution, the latter will be pre-
ferred. Id. ch. 7, art. 66(1). Statutory Law would include both the primary legislation contained
in Acts of Parliament and secondary legislation. The latter is legislation made under the authority
of an act of Parliament. In the case of conflict between statutory law and the Constitution, the
latter is preferred. See id. ch. 7, art. 44; id. ch. 9, art. 79(2); id. ch. 19, art. 80(2); id. ch. 19,
arts. 131, 132. Thus, the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, to which statutory law,
common law, and customary law must conform. Statutory law overrides common law and cus-
tomary law. Id. ch. 8, art. 66(1).
2' Id. ch. 9, arts. 79(2), 80(2).
' Article 78(4) provides: "The Supreme Court and the High Court shall have the inherent
jurisdiction which vested in the Supreme Court of South-West Africa immediately prior to the
date of Independence, including the power to regulate their own procedures and to make court
rules for the purpose." Id. ch. 9, art. 78(4).
' Pan-American World Airways, Inc. v. S.A. Fire and Accident Co., Ltd, 3 S. Afr. L.R.
150 (App. Div. 1965). See also Binga v. Cabinet for S. W. Africa, 3 S. Afr. L.R. 155 (App.
Div. 1988); Gerhard Erasmus, The Namibian Constitution and the Application of International
Law 15 S. AFRICAN Y.B. INT'L L. 81, 91 (1989-90) (stating that South Africa followed the
approach of other common law countries).
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Africa,3 ' subject, however, to recognized exceptions.32 For example,
international customary law in conflict with statutory law would not be
incorporated.3 The question of the relationship between international law
and South African law - and therefore Namibian law - was reason-
ably clear as of March 21, 1990.
While in many cases it is left to national courts to settle the rela-
tionship between international law and the municipal law of their coun-
tries, it is preferable that this question should be settled in a systematic
way by a legal instrument. In this circumstance a respective country's
constitution is unquestionably the best legal instrument for solving such
questions. Thus, upon the establishment of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many the drafters of the German Grundgezetz of 1949 defined the rela-
tionship between international law and German law in article 25 which
provides that: "The general rules of public international law are an inte-
gral part of federal law. They shall take precedence over the laws and
shall directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal
territory."34
Whenever a new constitution comes into force, whether upon the
independence of a country for the first time - as in the case of the
' Nduli v. Minister of Justice (1978), 1 SA 893 (A); Binga v. Administrator-General, S.W.
Africa, 3 S. Afr. L.R. 945, 949 (S.W. Afr. Sup. Ct. 1984). On the extent to which international
customary law is part of South African law - and therefore was part of Namibian law at the
date of independence - see generally DJ. Devine, Note, What International Customary Law is
Part of South African Law?, 13 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 119 (1987-88). See also S. v. Mule en
'n ander, 1 S. AFR. CRIM. L.R. 517, 526-27 (S.W. Afr. Sup. Ct. 1990), where, in determining
the status of article 1 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in South West African
law, the court applied the principle of S. v. Petane, 3 S. Afr. L.R. 51 (Cape Provincial Div.
1988) (holding that Protocol 1 of the Geneva Conventions had not been accepted as international
customary law and was therefore not part of municipal law). See generally Erasmus, supra note
30, at 86 (stating that the approach is modelled on that of English law).
" For discussion of the exceptions, see DJ. Devine, Qualifications on the Incorporation of
International Customary Law into South African Municipal Law, 1 NATAL U. L. REV. 58 (1972).
See also H.R. HAHLO & ELLISON KAHN, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND rrs BACK-
GROUND 113 (1968); DJ. Devine, Permissive Rules of International Customary Law - An Ex-
ception to Incorporation?, 12 U. ZULULAND BULL. 5 (1988) [hereinafter Devine, Permissive
Rules]; AJ.G.M. Sandars, Our State Cannot Speak with Two Voices, 88 S. AFR. LJ. 413 (1971);
R.P. Schaffer, The Inter-relationship Between Public International Law and the Law of South
Africa: An Overview, 32 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 277 (1983).
"' Nduli note 29; S. v. Tuhadeleni, I S. Afr. L.R. 153 (App. Div. 1969). See also Erasmus,
supra note 30 at 89. See Devine, Permissive Rules, supra note 32, at 6-7 (examining other ex-
ceptions to the rule of incorporation of international customary law).
-' AMos J. PEASLEE, CONSTITUIONS OF NATIONS 29 (2d ed., 1968) (translating
GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 25 (F.R.G.)). See also id. at 280 (translating ITALY
CONST. art. 10). Cf IR. CONST. art. 29 (1937) (accepting the generally recognized principles of
international law as its rule of conduct in relations with other states). Article 29 does not, how-
ever, erpressly provide that international law is part of Irish municipal law. Id.
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Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 - or by the introduction of a
new constitution in an existing country, the opportunity is ideal for
regulating the relationship between international law and municipal law
in the country in question. Namibia, as mentioned earlier, gained inde-
pendence on March 21, 1990."5 A new constitution became effective on
that date, and the opportunity to define the relationship between interna-
tional law and Namibian law was not missed.
The Constitution of Namibia now deals specifically with the rela-
tionship between international law and Namibian law in article 144.36
Since article 66 provides that the existing common law - i.e., the com-
mon law in force in present day Namibia on March 21, 1990 - re-
mains in force only to the extent it is not in conflict with the Constitu-
tion,37 it follows, therefore, that article 14438 now overrides the law
which has been described above39 in the case of conflict. The provi-
sions of article 144 would appear to be quite a substantial deviation
from the previously applicable law. It is the purpose of this article to
analyze the provisions of article 144 and to point out the changes in the
law which have occurred.
TREATIES AND NAMIBIAN LAW
Article 144 provides that "international agreements binding upon
Namibia under this Constitution, shall form part of the law of
Namibia."'  In respect to international agreements, article 143 provides
that "[a]ll existing international agreements binding upon Namibia shall
remain in force, unless and until the National Assembly acting under
Article 63(2)(d) hereof otherwise decides."41
Article 63(2)(d) is, in fact, the provision which deals with
Namibian state succession to international agreements. It delegates to the
National Assembly the power to decide whether or not to succeed to
such agreements. It should be pointed out that the National Assembly is
not to be equated with Parliament. Parliament is the National Assembly
3 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
36 NAMIB. CONST. ch. 21, art. 144.
37 Id.
' Article 144 provides: "Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or Act of Parlia-
ment, the general rules of public international law and international agreements binding upon
Namibia under this Constitution shall form part of the law of Nanibia." Id.
31 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
4' NAMIB. CONST. ch. 21, art. 144 (emphasis added).
41 Id. ch. 20, art. 143. See generally Paul C. Szasz, Succession to Treaties Under the
Namibian Constitution, 15 S. A'R. Y.B. INT'L L. 65, 80 (1989) (discussing succession).
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and the National Council.42 Hence, the Assembly is simply one "house"
of Parliament.
From the above, it would appear that treaties are, in principle, part
of the law of Namibia.43 They do not have to be incorporated into
Namibian law by legislation.' The incorporation theory is adopted rath-
er than the translation theory. This represents a fundamental change in
the law. Under the law as it existed before independence and as laid
down in the Pan-American case,45 the translation theory applied. There-
fore, under current constitutional provisions, treaties - which include
oral agreements and executive agreements - need only be incorporated,
not translated into law.
A Namibian court faced with an issue concerning treaty incorpora-
tion into Namibian law would have to first resolve the threshhold ques-
tion of whether the treaty was "binding on Namibia" in international
law. With respect to pre-independence treaties, this would involve estab-
lishing whether the treaty had been concluded for Namibia by South
Africa, or possibly by the United Nations Council for Namibia.' In
deciding this question, a Namibian court should examine and apply the
general international legal rules relating to the formation and binding
character of treaties.47 If the court found that the treaty in question was
duly concluded and binding on Namibia as such, the treaty would then
be prima facie part of the Namibian law. At this stage the court would
then have to apply two further tests before finally accepting the treaty
as part of Namibian law.
First, the court would have to be satisfied that the National Assem-
bly had decided to succeed to the treaty under article 63(2)(d). The
power to decide to succeed or not to succeed would not seem to require
a legislative act. Article 63(1) provides that, in addition to its legislative
powers, the National Assembly "shall further have the power and func-
tion . . . [to decide] whether or not to succeed to international agree-
42 NAMIB. CONST. ch. 21, art. 146(2)(a).
"' See Erasmus, supra note 30, at 94.
'4 Namibian courts will take judicial notice of international law under both the Constitution
and at common law. Id. at 95.
3 S. Afr. L.R. 150 (App. Div. 1965).
For example, U.N. ratification, on behalf of Namibia, of the 1982 United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) took place on April 18, 1983. See UNITED NATIONS,
MuLTILATERAL TREATiES DEPOSED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, STATUS AS AT 31 DECEM-
BER 1992 at 761, 762, U.N. Doe. ST/LEG/SER.E/ll, U.N. Sales No. E.93.v.11 (Treaty in force
November 16, 1994).
' For example, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, contains rules which
are mainly declaratory of international customary law. See TASLIN 0. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW
OF TREArIES 18-19 (1974).
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ments." Therefore, the power in question is not legislative. The power
may probably be exercised by a simple majority,49 and appears to be
one residing solely in the National Assembly, not in the full Parlia-
ment.50
Second, the court would have to be satisfied that the treaty was not
in conflict with the Constitution or with an Act of Parliament.5 In this
respect, the conflict envisaged here would be with an Act of Parliament
passed after independence. 2 Hence, if a treaty should conflict with the
provision of a South African Act of Parliament, which is still in force
in Namibia by virtue of articles 25(l)(b) and 140(1), it is submitted that
the treaty provisions will prevail. Nowhere in the Constitution is there
any indication that the term "Act of Parliament" is to include Acts of
the South African Parliament. Article 140(4) provides that references to
then existing officials and institutions in South African laws in force at
independence are to be interpreted to refer to the corresponding
Namibian officials and institutions. There is, however, no similar provi-
sion in the Namibian Constitution that references to Namibian officials
or institutions in the Constitution or legislation enacted thereunder are
intended to refer to corresponding South African officials and institu-
tions. Hence, "Parliament" in the Namibian Constitution cannot include
the South African Parliament, even though many Acts of the latter re-
main in force in Namibia.53
Furthermore, a treaty will prevail over subordinate legislation which
is in conflict with it. 4 In this respect, one need only note that article
144 mentions only the Constitution and Acts of Parliament as overriding
international law."
If the court is satisfied that a pre-independence treaty binding on
Namibia has been the subject of a National Assembly decision to accede
to it, and conflicts with neither the Constitution nor an Act of Parlia-
48 NAMIB. CONST. ch. 7, art. 63(2)(d).
41 Id. ch. 7, art. 63(2)(d).
' See id. ch. 7, art. 67. See also supra note 34, and accompanying text, on the distinction
between the National Assembly and the Parliament.
s' See id. ch. 21, art. 144.
52 See id. ch. 21, art. 146(a) (defining Parliament). See also id. ch. 8, art. 65; id. ch. 20,
arts. 140(1), 140(3).
5' Professor Erasmus points out that compatibility with "inherited legislation" is not required.
He does, however, adduce an argument to the effect that compatibility could be required if arts.
25(1)(b) and 140(1) are interpreted as giving pre-independence Acts the same status as those of
the post-independence era. See Erasmus, supra note 30, at 100.
' See id. at 100. Subordinate - or secondary - legislation is that which is passed under
the authority of an Act of Parliament.
5 NAMIB. CONST. ch. 21, art. 144.
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ment, the treaty will be held to be part of Namibian law. There are and
should be no further conditions for incorporation.
As far as post-independence treaties are concerned, the National
Assembly is required by article 63(2)(e) to agree to their ratification or
accession. 6 In order to incorporate such treaties into Namibian law, a
court would, therefore, have to be satisfied that the treaty was binding
on Namibia as a matter of international law, that the National Assembly
had agreed to ratification, and that the treaty conflicted with neither the
Constitution nor an Act of Parliament. 7 A dispute has arisen in this
context. On the one hand, the theory has been advanced that an agree-
ment concluded by the executive, which is binding in international law,
automatically becomes a part of Namibian law by virtue of article 144
- provided of course it does not conflict with either the Constitution or
an Act of Parliament.58 On the other hand, it is argued that while the
executive may conclude international agreements and these may be valid
in international law, they are not a part of Namibian law until the Na-
tional Assembly agrees to ratification or accession. 9 The proponents of
this view go so far as asserting that if the executive were to enter into
an agreement which, by its terms, was to become effective on signature
- rather than upon ratification by the National Assembly - then the
National Assembly's ratification of the executive is unnecessary and
ineffective.' In this event, the agreement can become part of Namibian
law only by virtue of legislation. The legislation might be previously
existing legislation which authorized the agreement, or subsequent legis-
lation which translated it.6' This view, however, perhaps goes too far.
Article 63(2)(e) requires that the National Assembly "agree to the ratifi-
cation of or accession to international agreements which have been
negotiated and signed in terms of article 32(3)(1) hereof.''62 While arti-
cle 32(3)(e) empowers the President to "negotiate and sign international
agreements, and to delegate such power[,]" 6 8 the National Assembly
must still ratify any international agreement signed by the President or
his delegate. Only then will it become a part of Namibian law. If the
terms of the agreement state it is to enter into force upon executive
-1 Id. ch. 7, art. 63(2).
" Arnold M. Mtopa, The Namibian Constitution and the Application of International Law -
A Comment, 16 S. AFRICAN Y.B. INT'L L. 104, 106-11 (1991).
s Erasmus, supra note 30, at 101, 108.
s Mtopa, supra note 57, at 111.
60 Id.
61 Id.
61 NAMIB. CONST. ch. 7, art. 63(2)(e).
6 Id. ch. 5, art. 32(2)(c).
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signature, then the National Assembly's ratification following signature
would have the effect of translating the agreement into municipal law.
The above questions have recently come before the courts. In the
Carracelas Case' 4 the court held that the mere fact than an interna-
tional treaty has been entered into does not ipso facto make the provi-
sions of such a treaty part of the municipal law of Namibia.65 Legisla-
tive ratification of the treaty is first required before it will be considered
a part of municipal law. This, in fact, amounts to a third approach and
is more restrictive than either of the two previous approaches. The Eras-
mus approach' 6 is the most liberal and compatible with international law.
Under it, treaties binding on Namibia in international law are incorporat-
ed as municipal law.67 The Mtopa approach68 is more restrictive and
would require the agreement of the National Assembly for incorporation
in certain cases and legislation in other cases.69 The approach of the
court is the most restrictive, requiring legislation for incorporation in all
cases. The court apparently overlooked the fact that article 63(2)(e) of
the Constitution of Namibia does not require a legislative act for the
incorporation of a treaty." It requires only the agreement of one house
of Parliament," which does not constitute a legislative act. Since the
Constitution does not require a legislative act for incorporation, the
South African case law requiring treaties to be translated into municipal
law by legislation,72 must be deemed overruled by article 63(2)(1) of
the Constitution. In other words, the Pan American case is no longer
authoritative in Namibia, therefore the court's reliance on it to support
its approach was unjustified.
In summary, it is apparent that the correct approach, at least in
principle, is that of Mtopa under which international agreements become
part of Namibian law on agreement of the National Assembly, not upon
legislative action.
The view has also been expressed that an agreement, if it is to be
part of Namibian law, must be an international agreement. Hence, an
6 State v. Carracelas, High Court of Namibia (Nov. 10, 16, 20, 1992) (on file with Case
W. Res. J. Int'l L.).
65 Id. at 4.
See generally Erasmus, supra note 30.
° Id. at 91.
Mtopa, supra note 57.
69 Id. at 111.
'0 See NAMIB. CONST. ch. 7, art. 63(2)(e).
I' d.
72 See supra note 30.
" Mtopa, supra note 57, at 108-09 and accompanying text.
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agreement between the government and a non-governmental organization
(NGO) would not be covered by article 144 of the Constitution.74 This
surely is correct and, even if the National Assembly agreed to ratifica-
tion of such an agreement, this would have no effect. However, such an
agreement could become part of Namibian law on ordinary legal princi-
ples. It could operate as a binding contract, under municipal law be-
tween the government and the NGO. It would be presumed - unless
the contrary was stated in the agreement - that the contract was gov-
erned by the law of the state which was a party to the contract, in casu
Namibian law.75 Of course, provisions in the contract which conflict
with the Constitution, with legislation, with common law, or even with
incorporated international law would be void.76
The Law of the Sea Convention7 (LOSC) would appear to be in a
unique position in relation to the Namibian Constitution. It could be
considered a pre-independence treaty since it was adopted in 1982, prior
to the Namibian independence in 1990. The United Nation's Council for
Namibia ratified the LOSC on behalf of Namibia on April 18, 1983.8
On the other hand, it could be considered a post-independence treaty
since it was not in force on March 20, 1990 and only came in to force
on November 16, 1994. This poses difficult problems in relation to state
succession. In the Carracelas case,79 the court held that Namibia was
not a party to LOSC as it had not acceded to it.8° However, the court
did not consider the possibility that Namibia might be a party by
succession - presumably, because LOSC itself was not yet in force.
In cases where there are two possible interpretations of the Consti-
tution or of an Act of Parliament, one of which would lead to conflict
with a treaty while the other would not, it is apparent that the courts
should adopt the interpretation of the municipal law in question which
would avoid conflict with the treaty and with international obligations.
This is simply an application of an existing common law rule of statuto-
ry interpretation.8 This rule is reinforced by article 96(d) of the
7 Id. at 109 n. 19.
7S DANIEL P. O'CONNELL, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 979 (2d ed. 1970).
76 In fact, the agreements cited by Mtopa, though theoretically part of municipal law, would
be void under that municipal law because they would be in conflict with statute. See Mtopa,
supra note 57, at 109.
' United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 20, 1982, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261.
See supra note 46.
State v. Carraelas, High Court of Namibia (Nov. 10, 16, 20, 1992) (On file with Case
W. Res. J. Int'l L).
I d. at 4.
SI See GAIL-MARYSE COCKRAM, THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 131-40 (3rd ed. 1987).
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Namibian Constitution which requires the State to ensure that in its
international relations it fosters respect for treaty obligations.82 One the
mechanisms by which respect for treaty obligations could be fostered is
for Namibian courts to faithfully apply this presumptive rule of statutory
interpretation. Erasmus goes so far as to say that the intention of Parlia-
ment to disregard international law must be established beyond doubt
and, even in the case of the Constitution, every attempt should be made
to harmonize its provisions with international law. 3
INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND NAMIBIAN LAW
According to article 144, the "general rules of public international
law" form part of the law of Namibia.84 At first glance it would appear
that general rules of public international law could be either customary
or conventional in character. However, this leads to the conclusion that
a rule of international law contained in a treaty which was general in
character could form part of the law of Namibia, even if Namibia was
not a party to the treaty in question. Therefore, it is apparent that the
phrase "general rules of public international law" as used in article 144
should receive a more restrictive interpretation to mean "general rules of
customary public international law." The restrictive construction can be
deduced from the context in which the phrases "general rules of public
international law" and "international agreements binding on Namibia"
are placed in juxtaposition.85 The latter phrase is obviously intended to
deal with the status of treaty law as part of the law of Namibia. The
former phrase must, therefore, be interpreted as dealing with the status
of international customary law as part of Namibian law. With this inter-
pretation, there is no overlap or confusion between the phrases.
The principle that international customary law forms part of
Namibian law is, therefore, confirmed by the Constitution. It is neces-
sary, however, to examine the precise ambit of the principle established
in article 144. A number of observations are appropriate.
First, article 144 only incorporates general rules of public interna-
tional law. It would therefore seem that neither regional customary inter-
national law,86 nor particular customary international law7 will form
part of the law of Namibia. This would appear to be the case even if
Namibia is bound by such customary rules as a matter of international
82 NAMIB. CONST. ch. 11, art. 96(d).
" Erasmus, supra note 30, at 94.
84 NAMIB. CONST. ch. 21, art. 144.
" Id.
For discussion of this concept, see Devine, supra note 31, at 124-25.
'7 Id. at 125-26.
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law. The incorporation theory is confined to rules of general internation-
al customary law.8 In this respect, the legal position under article 144
is different from the law which applied immediately before indepen-
dence. In accordance with the principles established in the pre-indepen-
dence case of Nduli,89 it was possible to incorporate rules of regional
and particular international customary law into municipal law." Article
144 now excludes this possibility.91
Second, it would appear to be clear that a rule of universal interna-
tional customary law will ipso facto also be a rule of general interna-
tional customary law.' It, therefore, follows that universal international
customary law would also form part of the law of Namibia. In this
respect the position does not differ materially to that which existed prior
to independence.
Third, it would also appear to be clear that rules of international
customary law, whether universal or general in character, will not form
part of Namibian law if they conflict with the Constitution or an Act of
the Namibian Parliament.93 In this respect, exceptions to incorporation
are clearly established. In addition, such exceptions existed, in principle,
under pre-independence law.94
As previously described, conflict with an Act passed by the South
African Parliament and which was in operation at the date of indepen-
dence, would not exclude the incorporation of the customary rule in
question.95 In fact, such an incorporated customary rule would override
conflicting provisions in such a South African Act.96 It may be noted
here that the court, in the Banco Exterior97 case, did not appreciate the
fact that, in terms of articles 25(1)(1) and 140(1) of the Constitution,
rules of international customary law prevail over conflicting South Afri-
can statutes which Namibia inherited on independence. Compatibility
See generally id. at 120.
Supra note 29.
See generally Devine, supra note 31, at 124-27.
9' Professor Erasmus, while admitting that a literal interpretation of article 144 would ex-
clude the incorporation of regional and particular - i.e., local - international customary law, he
nevertheless prefers the thesis that all international customary law is incorporated because all
such law is based on the principle of pacta sunt servanda. See Erasmus, supra note 30, at 98-
99.
9 Id. at 99.
93 NAMIB. CONST. ch. 21, art. 144.
' See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
9' See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
9 See supra note 53.
' Banco Exterior de Espana S.A. v. Republic of Namibia, 2 S. Afr. L.R. 432 (Namib. High
Ct. 1991).
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with "inherited legislation" is not required.98 In casu the court gave ef-
fect to the provisions of an - arguably - South African statute autho-
rizing the forfeiture of a vessel which had been used in committing a
fishing offence." The court, however, went further by holding that in-
nocent third parties who had mortgage bonds in the vessels also lost
their rights. This, in effect, amounted to a confiscation of the property
of innocent, third-party foreigners without prompt, fair, and effective
compensation." As such, it was contrary to the minimum standard of
treatment which international customary law gives to foreigners.'" It is
clear that on a proper interpretation of the Namibian Constitution,"°
the court should have at least tried to reconcile the punitive provisions
of the Sea Fisheries Act of 1973103 with international customary law,
insofar as each made provision for the confiscation of the assets of
innocent foreigners. It is interesting to note that the law as declared by
the court has now been rectified by legislation." It is no longer possi-
ble to confiscate the assets of innocent foreigners which have been used
in committing fisheries offenses.'
Fourth, the text of article 144 presents a problem of interpretation
when it incorporates into Namibian law "the general rules of public
international law and international agreements binding upon
Namibia."'"1 6 It is quite clear that if international agreements are to be
part of the Namibian law, they must be "binding on Namibia." The
question arises, however, whether general international customary law, if
it is to be part of Namibian law, must also be "binding on Namibia."
Does the latter phrases in article 144 qualify both custom and treaties,
or the latter only? Both possible interpretations will now be considered.
A. Customary law is not required to be "binding on Namibia"
The consequences of this interpretation are that any general rule of
international customary law would be part of Namibian law. It would be
immaterial that Namibia might not be bound by that rule as a matter of
international law. For example, the Namibian state might have had the
9 Erasmus, supra note 30, at 100.
See Sea Fisheries Act, § 17, Act 58 (1973).
1W O'CONNELL, supra note 75, at 762, 777, 780.
WI See GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER & E.D. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 84
(6th ed. 1976).
'o' NAMIB. CONST. ch. 3, art. 25(1)(b); id. ch. 20, art. 140(1).
103 Act 58 (1973).
"o See Sea Fisheries Act, Act 29 (1992) (Namib.).
'o5 See id. § 35(3).
101 NAMIB. CONST. ch. 21, art. 144.
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status of a persistent objector to the rule in international law and thus
not be bound by it,"° yet Namibian courts would be obliged to give
effect to the rule in municipal law simply because it is a general rule.
This would be an anomalous situation.
B. Customary law, in order to be law in Namibia, must be "binding on
Namibia"
It is submitted that this would be a more appropriate interpretation
of article 144. The words "binding on Namibia" would be seen as quali-
fying not only treaties, but also international customary law. Such an
interpretation would prevent the anomalous situation where the Namibian
authorities could, in effect, speak with two different voices on a particu-
lar rule of international customary law. The government might deny that
the rule was binding on the state because of its status of a persistent
objector. At the same time, the courts would have to apply the non-
binding rule as part of the law of Namibia simply because it was of a
"general" character. In accordance with the suggested interpretation, the
approach of a Namibian court could be as follows. First, the court
would inquire as to whether the rule in question was a rule of general
- or universal - international customary law.' If the answer to this
question is in the negative, that should be the end of the inquiry. The
rule in question should not be part of Namibian law by virtue of article
144. If the answer is in the affirmative, the court could embark on the
second inquiry of whether the rule was binding on Namibia. If the
answer to this particular question is in the negative - because, for
example, Namibia has the status of persistent objector in relation to the
rule, - the rule, though it is general in nature, should not be incorpo-
rated into Namibian law. If the answers to both the questions are posi-
tive, the rule should be held to be part of Namibian law.
In carrying out the above twofold inquiry, the court should be at
liberty to introduce an additional element if it so desired. It could give
effect to the international law presumption that a rule of general interna-
tional customary law binds all states - i.e., that it is universal.'" In
effect, this would mean that once the court has established that a rule of
international customary law is general in nature, it would be presumed
to be universal and thus binding on Namibia. The presumption would,
107 BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 10; SCHWARZENBERGER & BRowN, supra note 101, at 27-29;
GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW II 45-46 (1968); Devine, supra note 31, at
120.
"0 Devine, supra note 31, at 121-22.
I' ld. at 120.
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of course, be rebuttable. It could be rebutted by establishing that
Namibia is not bound by the general rule because it has the status of
persistent objector in relation to the rule in question."'
Consistency is another reason to interpret article 144 to require that
general customary law be "binding on Namibia" if it is to form part of
the law of Namibia. The previous law on incorporation of general inter-
national customary law - established by the decision in the Nduli
case"' - was the same in principle. The earlier approach also in-
volved a dual enquiry: first as to the generality of the rule, and second
as to whether it had received the "assent of the country.""..2 Assent of
the country would, of course, have meant that the rule was "binding" on
the country. Continuity with the past is therefore preserved by the sug-
gested interpretation of article 144. Furthermore, one can fall back on
the interpretative rule that legislation - and perhaps also a constitution-
al provision - should be interpreted in a manner which brings about as
little change in the existing law as possible."'
The incorporation of universal international customary law into
Namibian law presents no problems regardless of which interpretation of
article 144 is adopted. A rule of universal international law will also be
a rule of general international law for the purposes of this Article. In
addition, by definition, it will be binding on Namibia simply because it
is binding on all states.' Hence, universal international customary law
will always be part of Namibian law. A Namibian court faced with a
question of incorporation merely has to establish the universality of the
rule in question." 5
Finally, it would appear to be clear from article 144 that a rule of
international customary law may not be incorporated into Namibian law
if it conflicts with the Constitution or an Act of the Namibia Parliament.
However, for reasons which were given when discussing the legal status
of incorporated treaties,"' it is submitted that incorporated rules of in-
ternational customary law will similarly prevail over other forms of con-
flicting legislation, including Acts of the South African Parliament which
. Id.; Erasmus, supra note 30, at 99 (According to Professor Erasmus, no additional acts of
acceptance by Namibia would be required for incorporation.).
. Supra note 29.
l' Id. See also Devine, supra note 31, at 120-24. Nor was positive acceptance by the South
African state demanded for incorporation. See Erasmus, supra note 30, at 88.
113 COCKRAM, supra note 81, 139-40; LUCAS C. STEYN, DIE UITLEG VAN WET=rE 99, 153
(5th ed. 1981).
14 Devine, supra note 31, at 120.
"I Id. at 126.
116 See supra notes 40-83 and accompanying text.
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were in force on the date of independence."'
CONCLUSIONS
In light of the foregoing, the following conclusions are submitted
on the question of what international law forms part of Namibian law
by virtue of article 144 of the Constitution.
(1) Treaties
(a) Treaties which are binding on Namibia form part of the domes-
tic law, and the incorporation theory applies rather than the trans-
lation theory. This represents a change in approach from that of the
previously applicable law. In the former South West Africa a treaty
which affected rights had to be implemented by legislation to form
a part of the domestic law.
(b) There are a number of exceptions where provisions of treaties
will not form part of Namibian law. They are as follows:
(i) A treaty not binding on Namibia will not be incorporated.
This follows directly from the wording of article 144 of the
Constitution.
(ii) If the National Assembly does not give its agreement to
ratification, the treaty will not be incorporated. It should be
noted here that the agreement is that of one house of Parlia-
ment,18 and, thus, does not constitute a legislative act. 9 The
power to agree to ratification of treaties is specifically given to
the National Assembly by article 63(2)(e).
(iii) If the treaty is in conflict with the Constitution, it directly
follows from the provisions of article 144 that it will not be
incorporated.
(iv) If the treaty conflicts with an Act of the Namibian Parlia-
ment, incorporation will not occur. This also flows directly from
the provisions of article 144. In cases of doubt, however, an Act
of Parliament should, if possible, be interpreted in such a man-
ner as to avoid conflict.
(v) The National Assembly may override a pre-independence
treaty by a decision not to succeed to it. Such a treaty will then
.. See Erasmus, supra note 30, at 100.
"' For the distinction between the National Assembly and Parliament, see supra note 42 and
accompanying text.
"" According to the court in State v. Carracelas, High Court of Namibia (Nov. 10, 16, 20,
1992) (on file with Case W. Res. J. Int'l L.), legislation is necessary for incorporation. Thus, the
translation theory would apply.
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not be incorporated into present domestic law. This power is
given to the Assembly by article 63(2)(d). Again, it is a power
given to one house of the legislature, not to the whole Parlia-
ment. This power, and the power to agree to ratification of
treaties under article 63(2)(e), is reminiscent of the power of
"advise and consent" given to the Senate of the United States in
relation to treaties.12
0
(c) A binding treaty incorporated into Namibian law will override
all conflicting legislation, except the Constitution and Acts of the
Namibian Parliament. This flows from article 144. Acts of the
South African Parliament applicable to Namibia on the date of
independence will also be overridden, insofar as their provisions
conflict with an incorporated treaty. This situation results from the
definition of "Parliament" in article 146(2)(a).' "Parliament" is
defined as the Namibian Parliament only." Hence, only Acts of
the Namibian Parliament will override conflicting treaty provisions.
(2) International Customary Law
(a) In principle, general international customary law binding on
Namibia is incorporated into Namibian law. This, again, flows from
the provisions of article 144.
(b) It follows that universal customary law is similarly incorporated.
"Universal" international customary law will, by definition, also be
''general."
(c) Neither regional, nor particular international customary law can
form part of Namibian law since they cannot be described as "gen-
eral" rules of public international law. This represents a change in
approach from the past. The principle of incorporation established
in the Nduli case" was wide enough to incorporate regional or
local international customary law where these could be said to have
received the assent of the country - South Africa. 4
(d) Under article 144, international customary law cannot be incor-
porated if it conflicts with either the Constitution or an Act of the
,20 NAMIB. CONST. ch. 7, art. 63(2)(e).
121 Id. ch. 20, art. 146(2)(a).
12 Id.
' Supra note 29.
124 The court in Nkondo v. Minister of Police, 2 S. Afr. L.R. 894, 908-09 (Orange Free State
Provincial Div. 1980), considered the possible incorporation of a local international custom al-
leged to exist in relations between South Africa and Lesotho. In the final analysis, however, the
court held that the "custom" had not been established. Id.
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Namibian Parliament.
(e) An incorporated rule of international customary law will over-
ride other conflicting legislation including Acts of the South Afri-
can Parliament which were in force at the date of indepen-
dence.Is As pointed out, in terms of article 146(2)(a), "Parlia-
ment" includes only the Namibian Parliament'26 and, therefore,
only Acts of the Namibian Parliament prevail over conflicting inter-
national customary law.'27
(3) General Attitude of the Namibian Constitution to International Law
The approach of the Namibian Constitution to the incorporation of inter-
national law has been described as "international law friendly.' ' " Pub-
lic international law is clearly incorporated - rather than translated -
by article 144, there are also other provisions which indicate "interna-
tional law friendliness." Article 96(d) promises respect for international
law and treaty obligations.'29 Article 199(2) provides that international
disputes should be settled by peaceful means. 3 Article 95(d) provides
that membership of international organizations is a principle of state
policy.'' This "international law friendliness" creates a juridical atmo-
sphere which should influence courts in their general approach to incor-
poration. It indicates the following guidelines should be followed by
courts seized of incorporation questions.
(a) The Namibian approach is a radical departure from the past. It
is, therefore, best to approach all questions in relation to incorpora-
tion from a fresh starting point-namely, article 143 on the specific
question of state succession to treaties,' and article 144 for the
general question of the incorporation of international law into
Namibian law.'
(b) As a direct result of this, it is best to ignore all of the excep-
tions to the incorporation of international customary law contained
'* The court in Banco Exterior de Espana S.A. v. Republic of Namibia, 2 S. Afr. L.R. 432
(Namib. High Ct. 1991), did not seem to be aware that this was the situation.
1 NAmIB. CONST. ch. 20, art. 146(2)(a).
12 Id.
" Erasmus, supra note 30, at 93.
129 NAMIB. CONST. ch. 11, art. 96(d).
110 Id. ch. 19, art. 132.
"I Id. ch. 11, art. 95(d). See also Erasmus, supra note 30, at 93.
132 NAM1B. CONST. ch. 20, art. 143.
133 Id. ch. 21, art. 144. See also Erasmus, supra note 30, at 100-01. In cases of doubt in
interpreting article 144, it is possible that, in the interests of consistency, support could be can-
vassed from previously applicable rules.
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in the previously applicable domestic law. Presently the only excep-
tions are now contained in articles 143 and 1 4 4 .134
(c) In the case of doubt as to whether incorporation should take
place or not, a court should, if possible, lean in favor of incorpo-
ration. The general atmosphere of "international law friendliness"
displayed in the Constitution would indicate such an approach as
the correct one. This might, for example, be a factor which could
influence a court in deciding whether or not to incorporate regional
or particular international customary law also into Namibian
law.
135
114 Erasmus, supra note 30, at 99-100.
135 See id. at 98-99.
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